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Summers v. State, Nev. Adv. Op. No. 112 (Dec. 28, 2006) 1
CRIMINAL LAW – CAPITAL PENALTY HEARING
Summary
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered after jury verdict, for first-degree murder
with the use of a deadly weapon, and assault with the use of a deadly weapon, attempted murder
with the use of a deadly weapon, and assault with the use of a deadly weapon, and from
sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed. The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the United States Supreme Court Holdings in Crawford v. Washington 2 do not
apply to evidence admitted during a capital penalty hearing. This and other issues raised on
appeal do not warrant reversal of his conviction and sentence.
Factual and Procedural History
Summers was an illegal drug dealer. During 2003, Summers entered into an informal
agreement with Fredrick Ameen (an addict who owed Summers money) to sell “crack” cocaine,
and to pay for a motel room from which he could sell the drugs; Summers would of course
receive the profits from the sales. On the night of December 28, Summers warned Ameen that
only certain people were to be allowed in the motel room. Later that night, Ameen, his associate
Albert Paige, a friend of Ameen and prostitute, Donna Thomas, and two others were in that room
smoking crack cocaine. When Summers later arrived, accompanied by Andrew Bowman, he was
upset about the number of people in the room. Ameen told everyone to leave; Paige and Thomas
stayed behind.
Bowman briefly left the room, but he soon returned and handed Summers a .38 caliber
handgun. Summers pulled out the handgun, pointed it at Thomas, and asked Ameen who she
was. Ameen explained that she was a friend, and that he had told Thomas about Summers and
had instructed her to come into the room. When Summers asked if Thomas knew who he was,
she replied in the negative. Ameen reminded Thomas that he had previously told her about
Summers, and when she began to speak Summers shot her.
Summers then pointed the gun at Paige and pulled the trigger, but the handgun misfired.
Summers then pointed the gun at Ameen, but Ameen did not see Summers pull the trigger.
Summers and Bowman left the room, and Thomas later died from the gunshot wound.
Summers was arrested and charged with several crimes, and the State sought a death
sentence. After a four day trial, the jury found Summers guilty of the first degree murder of
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Thomas with the use of a deadly weapon, the attempted murder of Paige with the use of a deadly
weapon, and of assaulting Ameen with the use of a deadly weapon.
Prior to the penalty hearing, Summers moved to bifurcate the hearing into eligibility and
selection phases. The district court denied the motion without explanation. The State introduced
victim impact evidence, showing that Thomas was the mother of three children and had worked
hard to support them before she moved to Las Vegas. The State then presented numerous
witnesses who testified about Summer’s juvenile and adult criminal history while both in and out
of jail, as well as 835 pages of documents regarding the history. Several police officers testified
of Summer’s criminal past, including reaching into his waistband for a gun after being stopped
by a police officer for jaywalking, gang affiliations, carjacking with the use of a deadly weapon,
and problems while in jail.
Summers called several family members to testify on his behalf, stating that his mother
and father were alcoholics, his parents beat him, and that he had an impoverished childhood.
Summers had asked to be removed from the courtroom prior to the start of the hearing and did
not make a statement in allocution.
The jury found four circumstances aggravated the murder and six mitigating
circumstances. The jurors concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigating circumstances and imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for
Thomas’ murder. The district court entered a judgment of conviction, sentencing Summers to
more than two consecutive terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Discussion
Application of the Confrontation Clause and Crawford v. Washington to a capital penalty
hearing
Summers’ first argument was that the Confrontation Clause and Crawford 3 apply to a
capital penalty hearing and therefore the admission of nearly 835 pages of documentary exhibits
containing testimonial hearsay violated his right to confrontation. The court disagreed. Neither
the Confrontation Clause nor Crawford apply to evidence admitted at a capital penalty hearing
and the decision in Crawford does not alter Nevada Law.
Crawford 4 states that the admission of testimonial hearsay statements violates the
Confrontation clause unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. However, the Nevada Supreme Court has never
fully addressed the relevance of the Confrontation Clause in a capital penalty hearing. In Lord v.
State the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that the right to confrontation applies in capital penalty
hearings in one respect: admitting a nontestifying codefendant’s confession generally without
confrontation violates a defendant’s right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States. 5 Lord

3

Id.
Id. at 68-69.
5
Lord v. State, 107 Nev. 28, 43-44 (1991). See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968).
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addressed only the Bruton question and did not otherwise explore the right to confrontation at a
capital penalty hearing, thus limiting Lord to its facts.
Guiding this decision was the Supreme Court’s ruling in Williams v. New York, 6 which
stated, “most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in sentence[ing] would
be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to
cross examination.” 7 The Court rejected the contention that a death sentence based on
information from witnesses who were not cross examined violated the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Williams has since been relied upon to make the Confrontation Clause
inapplicable to capital sentencing, despite the case’s questionable viability. Crawford did not
overrule Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed whether Crawford has any bearing
on any sentencing proceedings, no federal circuit court of appeals has extended Crawford to
capital penalty hearings, and Crawford does not apply to a non-capital sentencing proceeding.
Additionally, under NRS 175.552(3) hearsay is generally admissible 8 in a capital penalty
hearing. 9
Other claims raised by Summers on appeal
Summers raised additional claims on appeal of a biased juror, judicial misconduct, and
cumulative error. The court concluded that Summers was not entitled to relief on any of these
claims.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions
Justice Rose, with whom Justices Maupin and Douglas agreed, filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. While J. Rose agreed that Summers was not entitled to
relief, they opined that the Confrontation Clause and Crawford apply to capital sentencing
hearings.
J. Rose explained that the two aspects of a capital penalty hearing treat evidence
differently. The eligibility phase stresses the need for channeling and limiting the jury’s
discretion to ensure that the death penalty is a proportionate punishment. 10 Thus, certain
evidence is excluded in the eligibility phase 11 and allowed in the selection phase. J. Rose also
opined that subsequent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has recognized that death is
different. 12 Additionally, in one Supreme Court case, certain testimony was admissible in a
capital penalty hearing because evidence rules anticipate that underprivileged evidence should be
admitted and left for the factfinder to rule on, who would have the benefit of cross-examination
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10
Buchanaan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998).
11
NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552(3) (2005).
12
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and opposing evidence. 13 Since Summers’ hearing was not bifurcated, the concerns of imposing
the death sentence arbitrary or capricious manner Confrontation Clause and Crawford still exist.
Accordingly, while capital penalty hearings may not necessarily need bifurcation, if the hearings
are not bifurcated then the right to confrontation should apply throughout the entire hearing.
Despite these general concerns, the constitutional error of no right to confrontation was
harmless because the verdict cannot be attributed to the error. The nature of Summers’ criminal
background, the nature of the murder in this case, and the sentence of a term of life in prison
without the possibility of parole instead of a death sentence all indicate that leaving the
testimony on record did not render the finding erroneous.
Conclusion
Neither the Confrontation Clause, nor Crawford extend to evidence admitted during a
capital penalty hearing. The reversal of Summers’ sentence is not warranted. Affirmed
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